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In this paper, we compare and analyse the systems for financing long-term care for older 
people in the Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The three countries 
share common political traditions of local autonomy and universalism, and these common 
roots are very apparent when the financing of long-term care is concerned. Nevertheless, the 
Scandinavian systems for long- term care (LTC) exhibit some important deviations from the 
idealized “universal welfare state” to which these countries are normally ascribed.  
For example, user charges tend to be strongly dependent on earnings, which is incoherent 
with the general norm of flat-rate public services. Also, there is significant regional variation 
in the level of services provided, which is in direct contrast with the universalist ambitions.  
Overall, the Scandinavian countries distinguish themselves through their very high reliance on 
public spending in long-term care. It is unclear to what extent the Scandinavian model for 
financing of long term care will be sustainable as demographic change progresses in the next 
few decades. 
 1.  Introduction 
The Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden – share a common history and common 
political traditions, which has led to very similar systems for social care being introduced in the three 
countries. This goes for the division of roles and responsibilities between different public bodies, as 
well as for the national policy objectives that have been laid down in various pieces of legislation. 
Thus, all three countries pursue the general goal of providing local care services free of charge to 
everyone in need, independently of their financial circumstances. 
Up to the first half of the last century, long-term care in all Scandinavian countries was provided 
almost  exclusively  by  families.  Only  for  those  lacking  family  members  and  financial  means, 
municipalities offered care in public poorhouses. Starting in the late 1940s, the public involvement in 
long-term care evolved from being aimed at poor elderly to a more general approach. The pioneers 
were Sweden and Denmark, whereas Norway, which at that time was the poorest of the three 
countries, enacted reforms with a few years of delay (Daatland and Sundström, 1997). 
In Denmark, nursing homes which were distinct from the traditional poorhouses started to appear in 
the 1920s, but the first piece of legislation that introduced universal principles for elderly care was 
introduced in 1949. The main goal of the 1949 Act was to provide temporary home care for infirm 
housewives; however, the scheme was extended to cover temporary needs of frail older people as 
well. In Sweden, municipalities were obliged to offer care in nursing homes starting in the late 
1940s. This increased reliance on the public sector was confirmed by a revision of the law in 1956, 
after which adult children had no formal responsibilities for their parents. In Norway, a similar law 
was enacted in 1964 (St.meld.nr.25, 2005-2006). 
Around 1950, the Swedish economy got overheated, and social reforms were brought to a standstill. 
Consequently,  no  more  public  nursing  homes  were  built.  To  compensate  for  this,  volunteer 
organisations started offering domiciliary care. This care was not means-tested, but offered to all 
elderly in regions where these organisations were operating. It soon turned out, though, that the 
volunteer organisations would not be able to carry out the expansion needed in domiciliary care. 
Thus,  over  the  next  decade,  municipalities  overtook  ever  more  responsibility  –  from  volunteer 
organisations as well as from family members. After government grants for domiciliary care had 
been introduced in 1964, a rapid expansion of these services took place (Söderström et al, 2001). 
Also in Denmark and Norway, the 1960s and 1970s were characterised by a rapid expansion of 
formal long- term care (LTC) services (Daatland and Sundström, 1997). 
During the first post-war decades, LTC services went through a gradual metamorphosis in all three 
countries.  The  traditional  “old  age  homes”  became  increasingly  controversial,  and  ever  more 
emphasis was put on dignity of the users and on the quality of care. Reformed care homes with a 
stronger  focus  on  medical  care  were  introduced.  Also,  there  was  a  clear  trend  towards  higher 
staff/user ratios, and the proportion of users with single rooms increased continuously from the 
1960s to the 1980s in all three countries (Daatland, Platz and Sundström, 1997). 
The public provision of domiciliary care in Sweden peaked in 1978, with 352 000 clients. The number 
of places in public nursing homes reached its peak at about the same time. In Denmark, the peak 
was also reached at around the same time, whereas in Norway, the number of beds in nursing 
homes kept on increasing until the late 1980s (Daatland, Platz and Sundström, 1997). After that, the 
1expansion of earlier decades has been reversed. In the 1980s, a retreat of public involvement in 
long-term care was driven by a marked improvement in the health status of elderly, improved living 
conditions as well as the awareness that there had been some oversupply in the 70s. 
In  the 1990s,  Sweden went  through  its  deepest  recession  since  the  1930s. The  economic  crisis 
caused severe financial problems in the public sector. As a consequence, the reductions in public 
provision of long-term care continued, and care was concentrated on the neediest. At the same 
time,  the  Swedish  model  with  public  monopolies  was  challenged,  and  some  municipalities 
introduced purchaser/provider organisations as well as voucher systems for domiciliary care. During 
the nineties, the share of private caregivers doubled. In Denmark, the long-term trend towards de-
institutionalisation has been almost as strong as in Sweden (Hansen, 2000), whereas in Norway only 
a small reduction in the number of nursing home beds has been observed (St.meld.nr.25, 2005-
2006). 
Since the late 1990s, the financial situation of local authorities in Sweden has been improving almost 
continuously, which has enabled them to halt some of the downwards trends in the provision of 
long-term care services. Some other trends from the 1990s have continued unabated, however, such 
as the ever increasing market share of private providers. Indeed, the current national government 
actively supports the introduction of consumer choice models at the local level, and has provided 
earmarked funds for this purpose. In Denmark, the government introduced a uniform system for 
consumer choice already in 2002 (Ministry of Interior and Health 2005), whereas choice of provider 
continues being an exception in Norway, in particular for nursing services. 
Other important innovations of the last decade are the tightened regulation of user fees and means 
testing procedures in Sweden, and a cohabitation guarantee stipulating that spouses shall be offered 
institutional care in the same facilities. In Denmark, a radical restructuring of the municipal sector 
was undertaken in 2007, when the number of municipalities was reduced from 271 to 98. The main 
objective of this reform was to create units large enough to provide public services in an efficient 
manner. Furthermore, a major quality reform is under way in Denmark, which aims at strengthening 
the rights of individual users and provides extra funding for quality improvements (Schulz, 2010). 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we provide a general overview of 
Scandinavian systems for long-term care. After that, the role of taxes is discussed in section 3, along 
with a brief description of the national systems for risk adjustment. In the following section, we 
discuss the role of user charges in the funding of LTC in Scandinavia. The final section concludes and 
provides a general discussion of the main features of the Scandinavian systems from an economic 
point of view, with particular emphasis on their efficiency and equity. Although our main emphasis is 
on Sweden throughout, we also aim at comparing and contrasting the Swedish case with LTC in 
Norway and Denmark. It should be noted that there are no insurance policies for LTC costs available 
on the market in any of the countries, and hence taxes and out-of-pocket payments are exhaustive 
as sources of funding. 
22.  Overview of Scandinavian LTC systems 
2.1  A Scandinavian Model? 
There is a long tradition in the social sciences of classifying different types of welfare regimes, such 
as Titmuss’ (1974) distinction between marginal (Anglo-Saxon), industrial achievement (continental 
Europe) and institutional (Scandinavia) welfare states. The most well-known typology is probably 
that of Esping-Andersen (1990), which divides welfare states into  Corporatist, Liberal and Social 
Democrat. A further typology was provided by Korpi and Palme (1998), who distinguish no less than 
five  different  types  of  welfare  state  regimes.  No  matter  which  typology  chosen,  the  countries 
covered  in  this  chapter  are  always  part  of  the  same  category,  which  is  referred  to  as  the 
institutional, Social Democratic, Scandinavian, universal or encompassing model. 
The defining traits of this Scandinavian welfare model, according to Esping-Andersen, are, firstly, the 
existence of highly de-commodifying and universalistic programmes; secondly, equal rights of blue- 
and white-collar workers and thirdly, all strata are incorporated in one universal insurance system, 
but benefits are graduated according to earnings. Korpi and Palme (1998), on the other hand, define 
their  “encompassing”  welfare  state  as  a  model  that  combines  earnings-related  benefits  with 
universalism, providing basic security to all citizens and earnings-related benefits to the working 
population.  Finally,  Rothstein  (1998)  mentions  the  provision  of  publicly  provided  universally 
available services as one out of three defining characteristics of the universal Swedish welfare state 
– the two other being a system of flat rate benefits tied to citizenship (e.g. basic pensions) and a 
mandatory social insurance system (e.g. sick pay). 
Obviously, all these typologies represent ideal types, and it should be expected that each real-world 
welfare state will exhibit deviations from these criteria. As far as long-term care is concerned, there 
are  certainly some  notable  deviations  from  the  principles  of  the  “universal”  or “encompassing” 
welfare  model.  Firstly,  all  the  Scandinavian  countries  have  elements  of  means-testing  in  the 
provision of care services: higher fees are charged from those who earn more, at least for some 
types of services. Secondly, only the availability of long-term care services is universal, whereas 
there tend to be no universal principles for how needs assessment is to be carried out, how needs 
are mapped into care packages, or for the quality of services. This is in clear contrast with the 
countries that have a social insurance system for LTC, and where all these issues are regulated by 
law (Wittenberg and Malley, 2007). 
In an attempt to categorise European models for social care, Anttonen and Sipilä (1996) suggested a 
division into three different categories. According to this classification, the Scandinavian countries 
practise the state responsibility model, where local authorities are responsible for the provision of 
care services, which are universal and widely available. This model is contrasted with the family care 
model  (Southern  Europe)  with  families  as  main  care  providers,  and  the  subsidiary  model  (The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and France) where the family also plays an important role, but 
where substitutes for family care are available when necessary. However, the value added by this 
classification is questionable since it is based  entirely on one single dimension of very complex 
systems for long-term care; i.e., who is the primary provider of care. Furthermore, it wrongly gives 
the impression that family care is of limited importance in Scandinavia, which is not correct in 
general. 
32.2  Governance 
In all three countries, municipalities have the responsibility of financing and providing long-term 
care, whereas the national government is responsible for overall control and for establishing the 
broad legislative and financial framework for health and social policy, including care for the elderly. 
The  responsibilities  of  municipalities  as  regards  LTC  are  regulated  in  Social  Services  Acts.  They 
typically state that every resident who is in need has a right to home-based or institution-based care. 
Municipalities  are  further  obliged  to  actively  investigate  needs  in  the  local  population,  and  to 
promote good living conditions in other ways. Furthermore, all three countries have the explicit 
objective to make it possible for older people to stay at home and live independently as long as 
possible (Socialstyrelsen, 2002). 
Although the structure of governance is almost identical in the three countries, there is nevertheless 
an important difference in the degree of decentralisation of the local democracy. In Sweden, the 
emphasis has traditionally been on economies of scale, and in the post-war era there were several 
waves of restructuring of the municipal sector to create units large enough to be able to carry out 
their tasks effectively. Thus, the total number of Swedish municipalities has decreased by almost 90 
per cent since 1950 (Daatland and Sundström, 1997). In Norway, on the other hand, the emphasis 
has been much more on local democracy and on keeping a high level of services also in remote 
areas. In Denmark, a major reform of the governance structure was undertaken in 2007, where the 
number  of municipalities was  reduced  from  271  to  98.  Consequently,  Norway  has  the  smallest 
municipal units (430 municipalities on a population of 4.9 million), Sweden is an intermediate case 
(290 municipalities on 9 million people), and Denmark has the largest units: 5.5 million inhabitants 
are distributed over 98 municipalities. 
2.3  The LTC Sector 
To get a picture of the size and importance of the LTC sector in Scandinavia, services of long-term 
nursing care is presented in Table 1 as a percentage of GDP. The numbers include expenditure on 
day care and in-patient care in nursing homes and long-term nursing care at home. In 2006 the 
OECD average of LTC expenditure was 0.8%, this puts Denmark and Norway way above the average 
and Sweden just below.  
Table 1. Health care expenditure on LTC as a percentage of GDP.1 
Year  Denmark  Norway  Sweden 
2003  1.96  2.37  0.72 
2004  2.02  2.20  0.72 
2005  2.07  2.14  0.71 
2006  2.07  2.14  0.70 
2007  2.00  n.a.  0.70 
                                                           
1 Source: EUROSTAT 2010. The numbers are based on the System of Health Accounts (SHA), a system developed 
jointly by OECD, WHO and EUROSTAT. The data include expenditure on day care and in-patient care in nursing homes 
and long-term nursing care at home. Long term care is usually a mix of medical (including long-term nursing care) and 
social services. SHA only includes the medical part of long-term care expenditure. 
4The most  striking feature of these numbers is that Sweden on average lies approximately 1.35 
percentage  points  below  Denmark  and  Norway.  Although  the  SHA  is  the  dominant  source  for 
comparison of health expenditure across countries within the OECD, there are several reasons why 
the LTC expenditure numbers should be viewed with scepticism. According to Søgaard (2009) long-
term care expenditure is the least reliable component of the SHA. The reason is that the definitions 
and measurement instructions for LTC expenditure are so vague that they leave room for wide 
interpretations and consequently, the numbers reported seem to be inconsistent across countries. 
Thus, the OECD average should be treated with caution. With regards to the Scandinavian countries, 
Søgaard (2009) classifies Denmark and Norway as using a broad definition focusing on care and 
personal assistance, while Sweden uses a narrow medical/nursing definition. Thus, there is a concern 
of underreporting by Sweden compared to Denmark and Norway. To compensate, we have also 
included numbers for Sweden from the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, which 
uses a broader definition of LTC expenditures, in Table 2. The total cost for publicly financed long-
term care in Sweden was SEK 87 bn. (€8.9 bn.) in 2007, which corresponds to 2.8 per cent of GDP. In 
real terms, there was an increase by 1.7 per cent in real terms on the previous year (SALAR, 2009). 
Over the past decade, Swedish public expenditure on long-term care has fallen as a proportion of 
GDP and also as a proportion of total operating costs in the local authorities. This reduction in 
spending has occurred even though the proportion of older people in the population has increased 
somewhat. The share of local public expenditure devoted to long term-care in Denmark is similar 
(Statskontoret 2009). 
Table 2. Trends in operational costs for local authorities in Sweden (Source: SALAR 2009) 
Year Total Elderly Care Total Costs GDP
2000 41.76 8.97 21.5% 2.99%
2001 42.37 9.12 21.5% 3.07%
2002 43.24 9.24 21.4% 3.13%
2003 43.27 9.17 21.2% 3.11%
2004 43.72 8.75 20.0% 3.03%
2005 44.13 8.61 19.5% 2.94%
2006 45.13 8.73 19.3% 2.88%
2007 46.13 8.88 19.2% 2.84%
Costs in 2007 prices (€) Elderly care as a share of
 
Out of total LTC costs, the main part is made up by institution-based care (61.3 per cent); home-
based  care  accounts  for  37.1  per  cent  and  preventive  activities  1.6  per  cent.  Throughout  the 
nineties, the share of institution-based care increased (Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 
1999), but since 2002, the proportion spent on institutional care has decreased (SALAR, 2009). 
2.4  Services Provided 
In Sweden, municipalities offer home help services, daytime community activities and similar social 
services to assist elderly living at home. Since 1992, municipalities also are responsible for local 
nursing  homes  and  some  other  care  institutions.  At  the  same  time,  a  new  general  term  was 
introduced for all kinds of accommodating institutions under the responsibility of municipalities: 
“special  housing”.  This  term  includes  nursing  homes,  residential  care  facilities  such  as  old  age 
homes, service houses, or group homes for persons with dementia, etc. In Norway, institutions are 
5categorised as either nursing homes or supported housing, the latter being housing rented or owned 
with care facilities attached or close by, but where there is no resident nursing staff (St.meld.nr.25).  
In Denmark, the distinction between institutional and home care has become blurred in the last few 
decades. Since 1987 no conventional nursing homes have been built and housing arrangement is 
separated from service provision. Institutional care has been replaced by 24- hour health and social 
supplied to all elderly in need, irrespective of housing.  The 24-hour care is accessible every day for 
persons in acute need (Colmorten et al et al. 2003). The municipalities are obliged to ensure that 
those who cannot remain at home, even if they receive care at home, are admitted to a nursing 
home or another care facility staffed around the clock. An admission board in cooperation with the 
home help, home nursing and the GP assess whether an individual needs admission to a nursing 
home or increased services to stay at home. Denmark also has a more sophisticated and universal 
system for needs assessment than the other countries. Everyone aged 75 and over is entitled to at 
least two preventative visits by a district nurse annually (Schulz, 2010). Since 1996, users of home 
based services are also entitled to a contract that states what services the person is entitled to and 
how many hours she is entitled to (Platz and Brodhurst 2001). 
Despite its high degree of reliance on formal care, the amount of informal care being provided in 
Scandinavian countries is considerable. In Denmark, 60 per cent of older people receive some form 
of help from their spouse, or from relatives and friends (Schulz, 2010). For Sweden, it has been 
estimated that the amount of help given by relatives to older people living at home is more than 
twice the amount given by local authorities. According to one study, as much as 70 % of total service 
hours were provided by informal carers in 2000, and the share is likely to have increased during the 
last decade (Sundström et al, 2002; Sand, 2010). Over the last decade, the national government has 
started several initiatives to support informal carers. For carers who leave gainful employment in 
order to care for a severely ill family member, a family carer allowance can be applied for from the 
social  insurance  system  (SALAR,  2009).  Similar  grants  exist  in  Norway  and  Denmark  as  well 
(Helsetilsynet, 2009). The assignment is conditioned on the carer being suitable for the tasks and 
that the arrangement is best for the elderly. In Norway and Sweden, the systems are very similar. 
Carers  receive  a  social  security  benefit  from the  central  government  and  a rather modest  care 
allowance  from  the  municipalities.  In  Denmark  the  carer  can  claim  compensation  for  foregone 
wages,  and  in  this  respect  Denmark  is  fundamentally  different  from  the  other  Scandinavian 
countries (Helsetilsynet, 2009). 
2.5  Volumes and Trends 
In 2008, about 250 000 people 65 years of age and older received some kind of long-term care in 
Sweden, corresponding to 15.3 per cent of the entire elderly population. It is apparent that the need 
for care is highly age-related even among the elderly: among those 80 years of age and older,  37 per 
cent received some kind of long-term care in that year. The situation is similar in the other two 
countries, but in Norway, there has been a marked increase in the provision of services to people 
below the age of 67 years. During the last ten years, the number of clients below 67 years of age has 
almost doubled and now accounts for approximately 25 percent of the clients of LTC and for 37.1% 
of total LTC expenditure (Sintef 2009:147).  This development is related to the de-institutionalisation 
of care for the young disabled. In Table 3, we have depicted recipients of home help and people 
living in institutions as percentages of the respective age groups for all three countries.  
6Table 3. Coverage of LTC Services in Scandinavia 2007-08. Statistics from: NOSOCO, 2009 








64-74  1.2  2.4  1.2  6.3  3.4  2.3 
75-79  3.6  6.2  4.2  18.1  8.2  7.4 
80+  14.1  23.7  16.6  42.9  24.9  21.9 
Total 65+ years  5.0  10.8  6.4  18.1  12.1  9.2 
N  48 921  66 528  106 163  154 571  74 423  n.a. 
Source: NOSOSCO 2009. Social Protection in the Nordic Countries table 6.2.12 and 6.2.13 
The emphasis of care tends to change somewhat over time. The trends in provision of home-based 
and  institutional  care  for  the  Nordic  countries  are  plotted  in  Figure  1.  For  the  Scandinavian 
countries, as we see  in the figure, there is a trend to scale down institutional care. The policy 
objective behind this trend is to make the elderly able to stay home as long as possible. The trend is 
particularly strong in Sweden but discernible also in Denmark, and this can be attributed to the Act 
on Housing for Older People (1987) which completely restricted the development of conventional 
nursing homes. Since 1987 no nursing homes have been built (Ministry of the Interior and Health 
2005).  
 
Figure 1. People living at institutions or in service housing and people receiving home help, as percentages of the age group 
65 years or more, 1995-2008. Source: Nososco, 2009. Note: data  for Denmark are only available with gaps 
The trends in Sweden over the last 20 years are pictured in Table 4. It is clear that the trend to scale 
down public long-term care continued during the nineties, but that the pace of change has been 
                                                           
2 Includes residents in nursing homes, sheltered housing, housing where care is provided and long-term stays in housing 
units. The figures for long-term stays in housing units are from 2008 and based on the age group 67-74 years. 
3 Age groups 67-74, 75-79 and 80+ years. 
4 Calculation as per 1 October 2006. The age group 65+ years furthermore includes people staying on a short-term basis and 
residents in service housing. 
5 Home help to residents in their own homes with the exception of service housing 
6 Age groups 67-74, 75-79 and 80+ years, including residents in service housing who receive practical assistance (home 
help) and home nursing. Recipients only receiving home nursing are not included. 
7 People who had been granted home help as at 1 October 2006 and who lived in their own houses or flats. 
7considerably slower in the last decade. Furthermore, the share of LTC going to the oldest group has 
increased throughout the period, which can be seen by comparing the number of users amongst the 
80+ group to the total number of users. 
Table 4. Recipients of Long-Term Care in Sweden 1993-2007. 
Source: Socialstyrelsen (2002), SALAR (2009). 
In Swedish domiciliary care, a restructuring could be observed in the nineties, where efforts were 
concentrated to the most severe cases. Thus, the number of elderly with weekly services amounting 
to 1-9 hours a month decreased significantly, whereas the share with services exceeding 50 hours 
increased.  However,  these  trends  have  clearly  been  reversed  during  the  last  ten  years 
(Socialstyrelsen, 2001, 2008).  
In Denmark, services are not as concentrated on severe cases as in Sweden. Amongst care recipients 
living in their own home, 62 per cent receive less than 9 hours of care per month, and only 3 per 
cent receive more than 80 hours per month. These figures reflect the fact that there is no minimum 
level of need that older people need to meet to be eligible for home help (Schulz, 2010). 
The  figures  presented  so  far  conceal  the  fact  that  there  is  considerable  variation  between 
municipalities, in all countries, with regard to volume, composition and probably quality of LTC for 
the elderly. Table 5 shows the coverage of long-term care in Swedish municipalities (out of 290 in 
total)  with  the  highest  and  the  lowest  cost  per  elderly.  As  might  be  noted,  costs  also  vary 
significantly, and the differences are not completely attributable to differences in the age structure 
in the elderly population (cf. Karlsson et al, 2004). In Sintef (2009), regression analysis on Norwegian 
data shows that -- when controlling for morbidity and age structure -- local revenue, municipality 
size  and  population  density  all  explain  parts  of  the  variation  in  LTC  expenditure  between 
municipalities.  















%  Total  % 
1993  149,650  9.7  121,340  7.9  270,990  17.6  92,181  23.2  89,433  22.5  181,614  45.7 
1994  145,034  9.4  128,553  8.4  273,587  17.8  90,665  22.2  94,855  23.2  185,520  45.5 
1995  137,572  8.9  129,843  8.4  267,415  17.3  86,653  20.9  96,058  23.2  182,711  44.1 
1996  129,543  8.4  127,012  8.2  256,555  16.6  82,956  19.7  94,509  22.5  177,465  42.2 
1997  130,059  8.4  130,725  8.5  260,784  16.9  84,788  19.8  97,715  22.9  182,503  42.7 
1998  126,049  8.2  118,715  7.7  244,764  15.9  84,253  19.5  90,787  21.0  175,040  40.5 
1999  129,479  8.4  116,254  7.6  245,733  16.0  85,217  19.5  88,623  20.3  173,840  39.8 
2000  125,324  8.2  121,305  7.9  246,629  16.1  86,070  19.0  93,717  20.7  179,787  39.7 
2001  121,741  7.9  118,621  7.7  240,362  15.6  84,816  18.3  92,807  20.0  177,623  38.3 
2007  153,700  9.6  95,232  6.2  248,932  15.7  110,700  23.0  76,100  16.0  186,800  39.0 





Crude Age Std. Crude Age Std. 65-w
Sorsele 8,453 8 8 10 9 28.1
Berg 7,931 14 13 7 6 24.7
Härjedalen 7,816 10 9 8 7 25.4
Åsele 7,804 12 11 8 7 28.4
Ragunda 7,739 14 13 7 7 26.7
Nat. average 3,309 9 9 6 6 17.8
Nykvarn 3,625 5 8 3 5 13.1
Salem 3,614 4 5 4 5 14.1
Håbo 3,613 8 11 3 5 12.5
Vellinge 3,542 12 14 3 3 18.1
Staffanstorp 3,509 5 6 3 5 15.9
Institution-based Care
Share of 65+ Pop.
Municipality
Home-based Care
Share of 65+ Pop.
 
Source: Socialstyrelsen (2009b) 
2.6  Composition of public and private providers 
Until the early nineties, Swedish long-term care was almost exclusively provided by local public 
monopolies. Private provision was limited to some complementary services like cleaning. There was 
also a broad political consensus that health and long-term care should be publicly provided. 
In the early nineties, private entrepreneurs were allowed into the market for long-term care. In the 
first few years, a rapid expansion of private care took place; the share of private entrepreneurs in 
the municipal budgets for long-term care quadrupled. This trend continued at a somewhat slower 
pace throughout the nineties (Söderström et al, 2001), and it appears to have continued unabated 
during the last decade (SALAR, 2009; Socialstyrelsen, 2009b). 
The impact of this change becomes clear if the shares of clients who are served by private caregivers 
are considered. These figures, which are given in Figure 2 show that private caregivers more than 
tripled their share after 1993. 
 
 
                                                           
8 ‘Crude’ refers to the actual proportion of individuals, whereas ‘Age Std’ provides figures which have been 






























































































Figure 2. Proportion of Clients being assisted by Private Caregivers between 1993 and 2006. Source: Socialstyrelsen 
(2002b, 2008). 
 
However, there are vast regional differences also in this case. The emergence of private caregivers is 
restricted to some 40 local authorities in metropolitan areas and some larger towns. In some of 
these, the presence of private caregivers has emerged as part of a consumer choice model, where 
the individual user may choose between competing providers. In other cases, the private element is 
simply the result of procurement at the local authority level. The development of consumer choice 
models has been actively supported by the current centre-right national government, and several 
municipalities have applied for earmarked funds to develop their own models (SALAR, 2009). A law 
regulating consumer choice models in public services was introduced in 2009, but even though a 
national system for consumer choice in primary care was introduced at the same time, it remains 
voluntary for the municipalities to introduce consumer choice models in LTC (SOU 2008:37). 
In Denmark, on the other hand, consumer choice has been introduced universally by the national 
government. In 2002 a reform (the seniors’ package) was enacted to secure the freedom of choice 
for the elderly. An older person who is entitled to subsidized housing is free to choose nursing home 
or special dwelling of their choice. Recipients of home-based care are also free to choose their 
preferred supplier. The local authorities must provide information on all providers that are approved 
to provide home-based services. The recipient can choose to have several providers; for instance, a 
public provider for personal help and a private supplier for practical help.  Private suppliers within 
the long-term sector need to have a contract with the municipality to have the right to provide their 
10services. The majority of the municipalities use the “approval model” that all providers that meet 
certain quality and price standards are approved as suppliers of home-based care services (Ministry 
of Interior and Health 2005). However, the Danish movement towards private provision started from 
a lower level than in Sweden: before the seniors’ package, there were no private providers of home 
care in Denmark. Private commercial providers of home care are gaining an increasing share of the 
market, but they are mainly in the field of practical assistance. Even today, the market share of 
private companies remains below 5 per cent in personal care, and the forthcoming quality reform 
will seek to improve older people’s knowledge of their possibilities to make an active choice of 
provider (Schulz, 2010).  
In Norway, several municipalities have a tradition of contracting with non-profit nursing homes, 
even though public nursing homes dominate.  Non-profit nursing homes are often owned and run by 
a religious or humanitarian organization. A contract with a municipality implies that their patients 
have been entitled to nursing home care similar to patients of public nursing homes. Apart from the 
city  of  Oslo,  where  some  nursing  homes  have  been  put  out  to  tender,  there  are  no  for-profit 
companies involved in publicly financed nursing homes in Norway. Also, within the home services, 
the proportion of private providers, is a lot smaller than in Sweden and Denmark. For practical and 
personal home help only a few of the municipalities have introduced consumer choice between 
public and private providers. In Oslo, there is a consumer choice model of home services and 21.5 % 
of the recipients have chosen a private provider in 2010. Regarding home nursing, patient choice 
between public and private provider only exists in the city of Bergen in 2010. We conclude that both 
consumer choice and the combination of publicly financed and privately provided long term care is 
clearly more prevalent in Denmark and Sweden than in Norway. 
113.  Taxes and Risk adjustment 
A  common  factor  in  Scandinavian  tax  systems  is  the  dual  income  tax  structure,  where  capital 
incomes are taxed at a low and flat rate, whereas labour and transfer income is taxed progressively 
(Sørensen, 2009). However, the system for income taxation differs amongst Scandinavian countries 
in two important respects: firstly, the degree of progression is considerably lower in Norway than in 
Sweden  and  Denmark,  and  secondly,  employers’  social  insurance  contributions  are  much  more 
important  in  Norway  and  Sweden  than  in  Denmark,  where  marginal  income  taxes  are 
correspondingly higher (OECD, 2009). 
Swedish long-term care is mainly financed from local income taxes, which make up around 2/3 of 
total revenue at municipality level. These general income taxes are charged by municipalities at a 
flat rate, averaging 20.74 per cent in 2010. These taxes are determined by local politicians who have 
a considerable degree of autonomy (SCB, 2010). Although political preferences give rise to some 
local variation in tax rates (the span is currently between 18 and 24 per cent), the average level has 
been remarkably stable over the past 15 years. In Norway as well as in Denmark, the local tax base is 
broader than in Sweden, and includes wealth and property taxes as well. Nevertheless, local taxes 
are slightly less important as a revenue source than in Sweden (Statskontoret, 2009). 
In addition to local taxes and out-of-pocket payments, the central governments contribute to the 
financing of long-term care through general grants paid to municipalities. In Sweden, such grants 
were introduced in 1993 and replaced a large number of earmarked grants. The current system 
consists of three main components: income adjustment, cost adjustment, and structural grants. In 
total, SEK 58 billion (€5.90 bn.) were transferred from the national government to local authorities in 
2008, which corresponds to 17.6 per cent of their total revenues (SALAR, 2009b). 
The overall objective of the government grants is to compensate for differences in tax bases and 
inherent differences in costs structures and thereby equalise the opportunities for local authorities 
to provide equivalent public services throughout the country. At the same time, local authorities 
shall not be compensated for differences in costs that are attributable to differences in service 
quality, user fees, or productive efficiency. The systems are very similar in the three countries, so we 
only report the particulars of the Swedish system here.  The Swedish system for government grants 
has been reformed in 1996 and 2005, and smaller adjustments were implemented in 2008. 
The income adjustment component in the system has the purpose to equalise the revenue side. The 
actual  tax  bases  of  the  individual  municipalities  are  compared  to  115  per  cent  of  the  national 
average. Municipalities whose tax bases fall short of this benchmark level receive a payment from 
the national government equal to the shortfall multiplied by the regional average of local tax rates 
(Statskontoret, 2008). In order to avoid perverse incentives for municipalities with relatively strong 
tax  bases,  the  fees  levied  on  net  contributors  are  calculated  at  a  lower  tax  rate  than  the 
corresponding  grant.  In  2008,  the  national  government  paid  SEK  52  bn.  (€5.30  bn.)  in  income 
adjustment grants to the 279 net receivers, and 11 well-off municipalities contributed another 3.7 
bn (€0.38 bn.). 
The cost adjustment component of the national grant is supposed to compensate for structural 
factors, such as demography, that are outside the municipalities’ direct control. There are separate 
models for all different types of services that the municipalities are obliged to provide. For each such 
12service, a ‘standard cost’ is calculated, and municipalities that exceed the standard cost receive a 
grant corresponding to the difference. This part of the system is symmetric, so municipalities with a 
favourable cost structure contribute the corresponding amount to the system. 
In long-term care, the standard cost is calculated using a partition of the older population into 240 
different cells, based on age, marital status and ethnic background. To each of these cells, a price tag 
is attached, which is based on the average costs of care at the national level. Not all components of 
this calculation are updated annually, however. Over and above the compensation for the standard 
costs thus calculated, there are special grants for institutional and domiciliary care in remote areas 
(Statskontoret, 2008). In 2008, the standard cost was SEK 8,410 (€855) per inhabitant, and in total, 
SEK 6.50 bn. (€661 M) were reallocated within the long-term care system. 
The third main component of the government grant system, the structural grants, were introduced 
in  2005  with  the  intention  to  compensate  municipalities  that  would  otherwise  have  suffered 
considerable reductions in their grants due to the new system. Two further components are the 
temporary grants which were also introduced to compensate for changes to the system, and the 
adjustment grants (“regleringsbidrag”), which were introduced to allow the national government to 
transfer more resources to the local authorities than what the system stipulates. 
134.  User  contributions:  out  of  pocket  payments,  means  testing  and 
personal needs allowances 
In Sweden (as in the other two countries), only a small share of the expenditures on long-term care 
is financed through out-of-pocket payments; according to the most recent estimates, this share was 
3.7 per cent in 2007 (SALAR 2009b), which is slightly less than the 5 per cent that were estimated 10 
years ago (Karlsson et al, 2004). Thus, out-of-pocket payments are less important for LTC than in the 
financing of childcare (where the proportion is around 9 per cent) but nevertheless considerably 
higher than out-of-pocket payments in disabled care (at less than 1 per cent). Despite this, long-term 
care fees of different kinds make up a considerable share of individual income for many old people. 
In the early nineties, municipalities were given considerable freedom in the design of the out-of-
pocket payments. Some general principles were laid down in law. These principles are that fees 
should be  fair, they may not exceed  production cost, and they must leave a  personal expenses 
allowance (“pocket money”). As it transpired that the municipalities made use of this freedom – 
which resulted in a great degree of arbitrary variation in the levels and principles for calculating fees 
– some reforms to the system appeared to be necessary. Thus, in 2002 and 2003 the rules were 
tightened. Firstly, a national cap on out-of-pocket payment was introduced, stating that nobody shall 
have  to  pay  more  than  a  certain  amount  per  month  for  personal  services  and  for  hotel  costs, 
respectively. The caps are indexed to prices, and currently the cap for personal care is SEK 1,696 
(€173) per month, and for hotel costs the maximum is 1,766 (€180) per month. Furthermore, the 
new law introduced a minimum personal needs allowance (currently SEK 4,787/€488 for singles and 
SEK 4,045/€412 per person for cohabiting partners). The reforms in 2002/03 also clarified how the 
user’s income shall be calculated for means testing purposes, and opened up a possibility to appeal 
against unfavourable decisions (Socialstyrelsen, 2007). 
In Norway, the general principles for out-of-pocket payments are similar to those in Sweden. For 
nursing homes, the user payment depends on whether the stay is short-term or long-term. The user 
contribution for a short-term stay is independent of the resident’s income. The municipalities can 
charge a flat rate per night and there is a maximum allowable rate set by the central government (St-
meld.nr.25). In 2010 the rate for a day and night stay was NOK 125 (€15.80; HOD2010). For a long 
term stay the user payment depends on the resident’s income. The municipalities are entitled to 
demand approximately 80 percent of the resident’s income above a certain lower limit. In addition, 
the municipality is not allowed to charge more than the actual costs of the service and the recipient 
must be secured a minimum amount of pocket money for personal expenses. The user contributions 
include board and lodging and all health care services needed including medicines and physician 
services. The copayment does not depend on the amount of services used by the individual resident. 
For older Norwegians living in their own housing or supported housing, the system of user payment 
is very different. In general, the regulation of user payments for health and care services correspond 
to the regulation that applies to the population at large. Older people living in supported housing 
other than nursing homes, pay housing expenses from their personal income. Public support for 
housing  expenses  may  be  applied  for  according  to  similar  rules  as  for  the  general  population. 
Primary health services are provided under the regular general practitioner scheme. Co-payments 
for physician services and medicines are according to the general regulation with an annual ceiling 
dependent on total co-payments and independent of an individual’s income. 
14For home help, Norwegian municipalities can freely choose the user payment to be charged as long 
as the payment is not above actual cost and the recipient is left with a minimum residual income 
(St.meld.nr25,  2005-2006).  Many  municipalities  offer  payment  schemes  with  income  dependent 
ceilings. 
We observe that there is far greater degree of income dependent user payments for patients in 
nursing homes than there are for services to the elderly living at home. Hence, for older people with 
similar needs for care there will be less costly for a municipality to provide nursing home care to a 
person with a high income compared to a person with a low income. 
In Denmark, there is no distinction in financing arrangement between institutional and home-based 
care. Residents in nursing homes pay rents approximated at the cost of housing and must also pay 
for other services such as electricity, meals, hairdressing, shaving etc. like for older people living in 
their own home. Home help and home nursing are provided free of charge irrespective of the type 
of housing (Colmorten et al, 2003).   
155.  Conclusions: efficiency and equity in Scandinavian LTC financing. 
The  Scandinavian  systems  for  financing  long-term  care  are  remarkably  similar.  The  institutional 
setup is almost identical in the three countries: the local government carries the main responsibility 
for funding and provision of long-term care, and the national government defines general goals and 
principles for the locally provided services. These general goals and principles are also very similar 
between the countries. Differences between the three countries are notable only in the emphasis of 
different types of services, or in details concerning the design of schemes for user charges. 
However, long-term care is a sector where two fundamental principles of the Scandinavian model 
appear to collide: it is difficult to reconcile the universalism of the Scandinavian welfare state with 
the political tradition of strong local autonomy. Thus, the models practiced for financing long-term 
care seem to be a compromise between these two general principles: municipalities  have some 
degree of freedom in designing local policies, but the national government intervenes to assure that 
the conditions are comparable throughout the country. 
In recent years, there has clearly been a trend towards favouring universalism at the expense of local 
autonomy. This trend is discernible in all three countries, but it takes on different forms in the 
different countries. In Sweden, the current national government tends to promote change on a 
voluntary basis, by providing funds that the local authorities can apply for in order to introduce new 
governance models in long-term care. In Denmark, on the other hand, much more emphasis has 
been on the rights of the individual user, and binding principles have been laid down in law. Clearly, 
the Swedish approach allows for more local experimentation, but it may also threaten universalism 
if other municipalities fail to follow successful pioneers. 
Concerning the economic efficiency of the Scandinavian model, it is difficult to make a general 
assessment. Some aspects of the Scandinavian systems appear to further economic efficiency: first 
and foremost the fact that there is one dominant payer which covers the bulk of LTC spending. This 
standardised  approach  should  give  rise  to  considerable  efficiency  gains  in  comparison  with  the 
fragmented systems in Germany, the United Kingdom or the United States, where the funding of LTC 
typically comes from several different sources. Furthermore, the Scandinavian systems entail, at 
least in principle, a considerable degree of institutional competition. Since municipalities are obliged 
to  provide  services  to  each  resident  in  need,  individuals  have  the  possibility  to  move  to 
municipalities that provide particularly good services. The national risk adjustment systems assure 
that the free movement of individuals does not give rise to financial problems in the receiving 
municipalities. 
On the other hand, there are some aspects of the Scandinavian model that appear to be suboptimal 
from an efficiency point of view. For example, in none of the countries, municipalities carry the main 
responsibility for health care.
9Since there are many situations where there is close substitutability 
between health and long-term care, there is a risk that local and regional authorities try to dump 
costly  cases on  each  other.  There  have  been  tendencies  to  integrate  some  aspects  of  the  two 
systems (cf. Schulz, 2010), but the risk of cost shifting is always there as long as there are two 
                                                           
9 In Denmark, health care is the responsibility of the  regional level of government, in Sweden health care is the 
responsibility of the county councils and in Norway, primary care is the responsibility of the municipalities and 
and specialist health care is the responsibility of the national government. 
16different payers with partly different objectives. Furthermore, the user charges in health and long-
term care tend to be different, so there may also be an incentive on the part of the individual user to 
pick the most favourable system. 
Moreover,  the  non-existence  of  private  LTC  insurance  may  be  interpreted  as  an  indication  of 
inefficiencies in the design of the public subsidy. For some individuals, user charges may amount to a 
substantial share of their individual income (e.g. in Norway, as much as 80 per cent of an individual’s 
income may be claimed as a payment for nursing home care). Risk averse individuals would naturally 
wish to insure this risk, and thus, it appears that the public sector crowds out the demand for private 
insurance, just as it does in the United States (cf. Brown and Finkelstein, 2007).This crowding out is 
generally  expected  whenever  benefits  from  private  insurance  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  public 
subsidy; i.e., when insurance benefits count as income in the means testing procedure. However, 
given  that  there  is  no  requirement  in  Scandinavian  countries  to  spend  down  assets  before  an 
individual becomes eligible for public support, the absence of private insurance might simply reflect 
that individuals put a low value on protecting their income in the contingency that they need long-
term care. 
Concerning  equity,  there  are  many  different  dimensions  of  equity  that  need  to  be  taken  into 
consideration. Hence, an equitable LTC system should strike the right balance between those who 
need care and those who do not; between young and old (since otherwise the political sustainability 
of the system might be in peril); between poor and rich – which a greater challenge than for income 
taxes in general, since there are important differences between rich and poor not only concerning 
resources  available,  but  also  in  terms  of  care  needs  and  life  expectancy.  Furthermore,  equity 
between men and women has often been overlooked in discussions concerning LTC, but this issue is 
of  tremendous  importance,  considering  the  fact  that  women  provide  the  bulk  of  informal  (i.e. 
unpaid) care to frail spouses or parents, whereas men tend to contribute more to the funding of 
public LTC services, but get less back from the system in terms of care. Thus, the design of an LTC 
system will inevitably have strong implications for discussions of gender equality (Karlsson, 2007). 
The great regional variation in coverage levels, quality of services, eligibility criteria and consumer 
choice  clearly  seems  to  be  inequitable,  particularly  in  view  of  the  Scandinavian  welfare  states’ 
universalist  ambitions.  Another  important  issue  is  whether  informal  carers  receive  sufficient 
compensation: given that there are no legal obligations to care for a frail family member, it would 
seem inequitable if family carers do not receive full compensation for their work. On the other hand, 
the design of Scandinavian LTC systems appear to promote gender equality: the heavy reliance on 
public funding and formal care services implies that there is relatively low pressure on middle-aged 
females to give up gainful employment in order to care for frail family members, and furthermore, 
there is a considerable degree of redistribution from males to females in the systems. 
The LTC sectors in Scandinavian countries will face  important challenges due to changes in the 
composition  of  the  population.  This  is  partly  due  to  each  country  gradually  becoming  more 
heterogeneous due to immigration from non-European countries. Since the tradition that children 
take care of their frail parents is stronger in these countries, the willingness to pay for publicly 
financed LTC may decline. More important is perhaps the change in the age composition that is 
taking place. Contrary to health care, where remaining time to death seems to be the dominating 
demographic factor that determines expenditures, LTC expenditures seem to depend on the age in 
17itself.  In Denmark the number of older people 80 years and above is expected to double from 
224,000 to 457,000 in 2040 (De Økonomiske Råd, 2009). The expected percentage increase is similar 
in  Norway  and  Sweden.  For  Norway,  it  is  estimated  (assuming  constant  productivity)  that  the 
number of personnel in the LTC sector has to double towards the middle of the century in order to 
maintain today’s level of quality (St.meld. nr. 9, 2008–2009). Hence, demographic trends are likely to 
entail important challenges both regarding the number of personnel needed and for maintaining 
public and universal funding of long term care. 
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